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Abstract
Background: This paper contributes to research in health systems literature by examining the role of health
boards in hospital governance. Health care ranks among the largest public sectors in OECD countries. Efficient
governance of hospitals requires the responsible and effective use of funds, professional management and
competent governing structures. In this study hospital governance practice in two health care systems – Czech
Republic and New Zealand – is compared and contrasted. These countries were chosen as both, even though
they are geographically distant, have a universal right to 'free' health care provided by the state and each has
experienced periods of political change and ensuing economic restructuring. Ongoing change has provided the
impetus for policy reform in their public hospital governance systems.
Methods: Two comparative case studies are presented. They define key similarities and differences between the
two countries' health care systems. Each public hospital governance system is critically analysed and discussed in
light of D W Taylor's nine principles of 'good governance'.
Results: While some similarities were found to exist, the key difference between the two countries is that while
many forms of 'ad hoc' hospital governance exist in Czech hospitals, public hospitals in New Zealand are governed
in a 'collegiate' way by elected District Health Boards. These findings are discussed in relation to each of the
suggested nine principles utilized by Taylor.
Conclusion: This comparative case analysis demonstrates that although the New Zealand and Czech Republic
health systems appear to show a large degree of convergence, their approaches to public hospital governance
differ on several counts. Some of the principles of 'good governance' existed in the Czech hospitals and many
were practiced in New Zealand. It would appear that the governance styles have evolved from particular historical
circumstances to meet each country's specific requirements. Whether or not current practice could be improved
by paying closer attention to theoretical models of 'good governance' is debatable.
Background
A generally accepted definition of governance stipulates
the responsibility and accountability for the overall organ-
isation of the operation of an organisation. More specifi-
cally, hospital governance has been conceived of as a
shared process of top-level organisational leadership, pol-
icy making and decision making [1]. The governance
process is orchestrated by boards – a group of people who
are ideally charged with responsibility and accountability
for the overall performance of the organisation. However,
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in a recent comprehensive review of health care govern-
ance, and with specific reference to OECD countries such
as Canada that began experimenting with the governance
function of health delivery organisations in the late
1990s, it was concluded that "new governance models
have appeared lately that defy the first principles of good
governance" [[2]:108]. D W Taylor [2] also proposed that
nine principles of 'good governance' could be applied to
health care management to combat this trend.
Given the importance of the governance function in man-
aging hospitals, here it is suggested that it may be timely
for policy makers and citizens alike of countries experi-
encing health sector change such as New Zealand and the
Czech Republic, to first consider to what extent their cur-
rent models of hospital governance meet the specified
'good governance' criteria, and second to address the
implications of 'good governance' for their respective
country's health care environments.
While it is clear at the outset that as countries New Zea-
land and the Czech Republic are quite different in nature,
historical circumstances, economic performance and geo-
graphical location, several similarities between the two
countries' health care systems are apparent at a macro
level of analysis. Both countries have plural health care
systems with a declared universal right to free hospital
care and a reputation for delivering high quality health
care in their respective regions [3-5] and each has experi-
mented with greater competition among hospitals and
with enforcement of their efficiency, quality and respon-
siveness [6,7]. However, the resulting public hospital gov-
erning structures are quite different with a more
formalized 'collegiate' system being in place in New Zea-
land, and an apparent 'ad hoc' system operating in the
Czech Republic.
Throughout the paper New Zealand is used as a case study
of a care system that has undergone, survived and learned
from several major transitions. Change was primarily
driven by a period of radical economic reform – colloqui-
ally referred to as 'Rogernomics' – beginning in the 1980s
and continuing in less dramatic fashion into the next two
decades [8]. It is compared with the Czech Republic which
as a state under Soviet influence (until 1989) practiced a
centrally planned forcedly egalitarian economy until the
Czech Velvet Revolution liberalised its economic and
political systems. Although New Zealand now has an eco-
nomic system which internationally is considered to have
many successful attributes [7-10], like most other OECD
countries such as the Czech Republic, it has struggled to
establish the best way of organising and delivering pub-
licly financed health care services. Thus, it is argued that
the two countries have in common a history of recent
major structural economic reform which has had a major
impact on the development and performance of their
health care systems [3,4,11]. The mutual experience of
ongoing institutional restructuring and reform fit the pat-
tern reported in recent comparative health services litera-
ture suggesting that "the most remarkable feature of
health care system reform among the 17 [OECD] coun-
tries is the degree of emerging convergence...in the general
direction of those pioneered in other countries" [[12],
5:45].
First, this paper presents a descriptive analysis of the two
countries as case studies of health care sector reform. This
provides a comparative overview of the internal structural
elements of each country's public hospital governance sys-
tem and demonstrates how hospitals as health care insti-
tutions fit into the external health care system framework.
Second, hospital governance practice in each country is
discussed in light of D W Taylor's principles of 'good gov-
Table 1: Comparison of health care indicators
Indicator Czech Republic New Zealand
Public health care coverage, per cent of population 100 100
Life expectancy at birth in years (2000)
Males 71.7 75.7
Females 78.4 80.8
GDP per capita (PPP, USD, 2003) 15,700 21,600
Health expenditure as a percentage of GDP (2002) 7.4 8.5
Public expenditure on health as a per cent of trend GDP (2000) 6.5 6.2
Health expenditure per capita (PPP, USD, 2002) 1,118 1,857
Infant mortality (Deaths per 1,000 live births, 2000) 4.1 5.8
Practicing physicians per 1,000 population (2002) 3.5 2.1
Practicing nurses per 1,000 population (2002) 9.4 9.4
Discharges (all causes) per 100,000 population (2002) 21,861 20,555Health Research Policy and Systems 2006, 4:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/4/1/2
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ernance' [2]. Finally, conclusions and recommendations
for future research are presented.
Methods
A literature review was conducted to collect relevant
descriptive and statistical data that is contained in Table 1.
Then a comparative case study methodology [13] was
used to gain information to empirically investigate
whether or not D W Taylor's [2] principles of good gov-
ernance were applied in the New Zealand and Czech
Republic health care contexts. This investigative approach
was taken due to a lack of an accepted taxonomy in health
care systems' research that would provide detailed infor-
mation on eligibility, benefits, reimbursement, financing
and delivery of health care services [14]. Another difficulty
in this research area is the dearth of available literature
reporting economic and health outcome performance
data that is easily comparable.
This preliminary part of the literature review process is
derived from an assessment of relevant publications
including government reports, working papers and aca-
demic articles concerning the two health care systems.
Table 1 presents a summary comparison of key health care
indicators of the two country's health care and hospital
systems [5,6,11,15-21] thereby establishing the creden-
tials for further analysis. It demonstrates that there are
close similarities between the two countries in several key
macro economic health indicators, e.g. health expendi-
ture as a percentage of GDP and per capita, the number of
practising medical staff (nurses and doctors), and the
number discharged from hospital. This information pro-
vides the reader with an outline of the contextual back-
ground for the paper.
Results
Case 1 – New Zealand
New Zealand was the first country to create a universal
social security system and free health in the 1930s. This
reflects a strong socialist tradition and it was the socialist
(Labour) party that introduced deregulation and market
reforms in the 1980s. These changes attracted much inter-
national attention and New Zealand has often been
reported as a "success story across the globe" [[8]: vii] in
structural economic reforms. Changes to the health sector
were founded on the idea that competition between pro-
viders would deliver the improved technical facilities and
cost efficiency, while competition between purchasers
would have improved allocative efficiency by making
them more responsible for their own health. However, by
1996, the competitive system was abandoned. It was
changed back to a co-operative system in which the roles
of purchaser and provider of services to contractual
arrangements are integrated and to a system where deci-
sions are made locally by elected health boards.
In 1999, a new Labour-led coalition government was
elected. The government opposed the market model,
arguing that it promoted unhealthy competitive tendering
for contracts leading to fragmented services, lacked demo-
cratic community input, and was neither accountable to
central government nor to local communities even
though it had not been in place very long [10,4]. Shortly
afterwards, the current structure of 21 District Health
Boards (DHBs) was established. Like the previous area
health boards, these boards are governed by a mix of
locally elected and centrally appointed representatives
and funded on a population basis. They hold the budget
for secondary and primary health services and must pro-
vide these services themselves or purchase them from
non-government providers. Figure 1 demonstrates how
the New Zealand health care system currently operates
[18,5].
New Zealand public hospital governance
Widespread change in the health care sector brought with
it a series of changes to the philosophical underpinnings
and governance of public hospitals. The 'pro market'
rationale of the 1980s emphasised the development of
competition among the 14 locally elected area health
boards created in 1989 that both funded and provided
hospitals and some other services in their regions. How-
ever, reports about this managerialist system pointed to
inefficiencies, poor management, budget overruns,
lengthening waiting lists and badly eroded assets in the
public hospitals [9,22-25]. In 1991 these health boards
were seen as inadequate by a new conservative (National)
government that responded by introducing market type
reforms in which separate organisations were responsible
for the purchasing and provision of health related services
Structure of New Zealand health care system Figure 1
Structure of New Zealand health care system.Health Research Policy and Systems 2006, 4:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/4/1/2
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[26]. Hospitals became publicly owned companies called
Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) administered by boards
of directors appointed by the Minister of Health based on
their management skills. The CHEs were subject to nor-
mal company law and were required to earn a rate of
return on capital comparable to that of the business sec-
tor. However, this competitive model did not deliver the
intended results either. Many CHEs inherited and contin-
ued to report deficits, barriers to entry limited contestabil-
ity, purchasers and providers of services struggled to
establish contractual relationships. Transition costs were
high and the expected savings were not made. While this
experimental quasi market model provided some tangible
benefits – average length of stay decreased, units costs fell,
better information management systems facilitated
greater accountability and better management of capital –
the evidence suggested that the overall goal of greater effi-
ciency was not achieved [10].
The next change came about in 1996 when New Zealand's
first proportionally elected coalition government
renamed the CHEs as 'Hospital and Health Services'
(HSSs) and removed their 'for profit' status. Later, in
2000, 21 locally elected health boards were reinstated and
New Zealand returned to a service model where boards
plan most health and disability support and are responsi-
ble for the level, mix, and quality of the services and for
meeting the health goals, targets and standards set by the
Minister of Health (MoH) [26,27].
Today, the majority of New Zealand hospitals are either
state owned and funded, or privately owned and partially
funded by the state. Public hospitals are divided into geo-
graphical areas called DHBs. Funding for DHBs is pro-
vided by central government and is population-based, i.e.,
it is done on the basis of the particular requirements of the
people living in the geographical location. The basic aim
is to maximise the health benefit from available funds and
to set priorities for demand within specified services
[4,27]. The primary key performance objective of each
DHB is to attain a fair and functional health care system
that is effective in contributing to the health of New Zea-
landers [18].
Although all citizens are entitled to receive state funded
free medical and surgical hospital care, those who choose
to go to a private hospital and who do not have medical
insurance must pay for services they receive. Private hos-
pitals are owned and managed either by private medical
insurance companies, individual investors or public char-
ities. The Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC)
provides universal cover for work-related illness and acci-
dents for all New Zealand citizens. Private health insur-
ance can be purchased by individuals for their own
personal medical and/or surgical procedure cover or it
may sometimes be provided by employers as a workplace
benefit. Funds for ACC are collected from employers and
employees by way of subsidies on wages and they are
administered and distributed by central government to
health care providers including hospitals [27].
Case 2 – the Czech Republic
In Czechoslovakia in the late 1940s a universal national
health service was created. It was largely free and funded
predominantly through taxation. The system was admin-
istered locally as well as on a regional and district basis.
Most acute inpatient hospital services were provided by
different types of hospitals at a district level. Type 1 hospi-
tals comprised about 250 beds and provided hospital care
in general medicine, general surgery, paediatrics, obstet-
rics and gynaecology. Type II hospitals were larger (about
680 beds) and provided more specialities. Both types of
hospitals often had attached clinics and outpatients
departments. Type III hospitals were typically found at a
regional level and provided more specialised services
including tertiary referrals. In addition to these acute hos-
pital services, non-acute beds were provided for 'spa'
(rehabilitative) treatments and in mental hospitals [28].
In 1993, Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic
and Slovakia. Regions were abolished and hospitals were
managed centrally, though local authorities were formally
in charge. A publicly funded General Health Insurance
Office was established and independent health providers,
for instance hospitals and community physicians have
contracts with this office. Some independent health insur-
ance companies were also set up in order to encourage
competition [29]. As was the case in New Zealand, these
changes, which rejected public ownership and operation
of the entire system, resulted from a perception of ineffi-
ciency in the systems in place during the 1980s and earlier
times [3,16]. Figure 2 outlines the way the Czech Republic
health care system currently operates (source abridged
from [5]).
Czech public hospital governance
The majority of Czech Republic hospitals are owned and
operated by the state and municipal government. Military,
state, and municipal hospitals are non-for-profit institu-
tions; while private hospitals operate on profit-based
principles. There are no private not-for-profit owned hos-
pitals. Public hospitals are mainly university clinics and
they are highly specialized facilities. State and military
hospitals usually have simple organisational structures
with a principal manager (called a Director), who reports
to and is controlled by a given state department [3,21].
Such hospitals have neither a board of directors nor a
supervisory board. Privately owned hospitals are divided
between basic health care or on narrowly defined spe-
cialty areas such as cosmetic surgery. These are governedHealth Research Policy and Systems 2006, 4:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/4/1/2
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under standard business principles and focus on issues of
effectiveness and profitability [30-32].
In the current Czech system, hospitals guarantee quality
and accessibility of health care for everyone and to serve
that purpose they have to become financially stable and
efficient. However, the majority of Czech public hospitals
record financial losses [30] caused by a range of obligatory
medical operations not covered by mandatory health care
insurance. Figure 3 shows the breakdown of ownership of
hospitals in the Czech Republic (data from [17]).
Table 2 presents a summary comparing the key features of
the structure and functioning of each country's public
hospital governance system. These are elaborated upon in
the discussion section.
Discussion
In this section information from the preceding case study
literature is discussed in relation to D W Taylor's [2] prin-
ciples of 'good governance' which are outlined in Table 3.
Each principle is considered from the New Zealand and
then the Czech Republic perspective.
D W Taylor's [2] first principle of 'good governance' is to
know what governance is. In this regard, New Zealand
DHBs have formal mission statements and clearly defined
performance objectives, codes of conduct and procedures
spelling out exactly what is required for the governance
function. Each DHB is comprised of 11 directors; seven of
whom are elected through a public election system for
three years term, and four are appointed to positions by
the MoH. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the hospi-
tal is appointed separately by the board. Care is taken to
ensure representation from all of the different community
stakeholder groups (there is a legal requirement to
appoint at least two Maori members to represent interests
of New Zealand's indigenous people). The elected DHB
members are legally required to establish consultation
processes whereby providers are users of health care serv-
ice, and the community has an opportunity to have an
input into the major decisions made by the boards. Each
board is subject to monitoring and an audit of both health
and economic indicators of the hospitals, which is carried
out by the DHB Funding and Performance Directorate
[27].
While New Zealand public hospitals are governed by
mixed-membership boards comprising medical staff, a
CEO and representatives external to the organisation,
Czech public hospital boards (if they exist) are appointed
by authorities and typically consist of medical staff and
local politicians. Governance in Czech hospitals is
defined and determined by the owners' relationships with
managers and there is a range of governing structures in
different types of hospitals. A two-level governing board
with a board of directors and a supervisory board com-
prising mostly owners is common [32]. Hospital manag-
ers are often appointed for a three to five year term by the
municipality or the governmental authority according to
their ownership. Due to the various ownership structures
in the Czech Republic, governing principles are often
inconsistent and they fail to emphasize the roles and
activities which are supposed to be carried out by manag-
ers and owners. Some owners have not taken over their
responsibilities seriously as they were 'gifted' hospitals
during the transition process. In these cases owners have
often been found to confuse their role with management
tasks [33]. The recent transformation of the health care
system and the resulting interactions among stakeholders
has culminated in a situation where personal concerns
often come before hospital performance [33,34]. A lack of
efficient control mechanisms and strategic planning has
also been recorded in the Czech hospitals [34]. This is not
surprising however given the governing corporate struc-
tures in other Czech businesses are reported as being
insufficient or less developed in general [35-38].
The second principle is the achievement of strategic ends
(goals). Social and economic pressures are increasing on
hospitals to be effective, i.e. to provide the right service at
the right place with a high quality. The governance struc-
ture and organisational structure of a hospital must be
such that both service and financial performance objec-
tives can be met, measured and accomplished [2,39]. In
New Zealand, hospitals are funded by the government on
a population basis and DHBs are required to decide on
priorities and objectives of financial resources allocation.
DHBs are responsible for both funding and running acute
care services in their jurisdictions and their financial activ-
ities are monitored by an external central government
Structure of Czech health care system Figure 2
Structure of Czech health care system.Health Research Policy and Systems 2006, 4:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/4/1/2
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agency, the DHB Funding and Performance Directorate.
This mitigates against misuse of funds, inappropriate use
of power and creates pressure to operate in an economi-
cally efficient manner. During the inherent consultative
processes, DHBs can re-allocate funds to areas with
increased demand and reduce funds to areas where alter-
native options or services are no longer required. The
community remains informed about and directly
involved in decision making.
Although DHB have to maintain the financial stability of
the hospitals, their major strategic goal is to improve, pro-
mote and protect the health of those within its district and
to expedite the independence of people with disabilities
within its district. Whilst not expected to return profit to
government, hospitals are required to operate within pre-
determined fixed budgets [4,27]. Boards are responsible
for achieving non-financial goals such as promoting the
health and independence of their populations. They are
also required to assess the health and disability needs of
the people in their regions and manage resources appro-
priately.
Principle three addresses the nature of the board-CEO
relationship. Boards have special responsibilities of pro-
viding a link between the hospital and its moral owner-
ship, monitoring the performance of the CEO, managing
the board-medical staff relationship, the board commu-
nity relationship, intra-board relationships. The New Zea-
land style of relationship resembles Taylor's idea of the
organisation being a series of stakeholders' concentric cir-
cles with the CEO in the inner circle. Although the board
has ultimate accountability for decisions that are made,
the CEO, clinical leaders and senior managers are all
involved in top-level functions decision making which is
done in consultation with the hospital's clients.
The nature of board-CEO relationships varies in the Czech
Republic where privately owned Czech hospitals have
'Ownership' of hospitals in the Czech Republic Figure 3
'Ownership' of hospitals in the Czech Republic.
Table 2: Comparison of key features of public hospital governance
Czech Republic New Zealand
Governing bodies State hospitals – no board of directors or 
supervisory board Municipal hospitals governed 
by board of directors.
Members are hospital employees, municipal 
representatives and business people.
Different number of members.
Public hospitals divided into 21 District Health 
Boards (DHBs), which serve as Boards of 
Directors for their hospitals.
Some are hospital employees and some are 
self-employed or employed by other 
organisations
11 members per DHB
Membership of a governing body State hospitals – no governing body.
Municipality hospitals – members appointed by 
town and municipality officials.
7 members elected through public vote every 3 
years, 4 are appointed by the Minister of 
Health (MoH).
At least 2 members must be Maori.
Member's pay Usually small fixed pay for a meeting. (Data not 
available).
Approx. US$15,000 annually.
Service delivery and financial targets Vaguely set by the ministry, town or district. Set by DHB Funding and Performance 
Directorate.
Accountability of governing body Indirect. Subject to 'public' control
Competence of a hospital director High competence and high autonomy over 
both medical and financial results.
Hospital CEO has high status and is a top level 
executive appointment
Accountability of a director Moderate financial involvement in potential 
profits. Threat of redundancy.
CEO is accountable to board for overall 
financial results and service delivery 
performance
Controlling body State hospitals – ministries: low direct 
involvement, subject to political changes, 
unfocused. Municipality hospitals – town and 
district representations: low involvement, 
subject to political changes, unfocused.
DHB Funding and Performance Directorate 
and Ministry of Health, subject to political 
changes, focused.Health Research Policy and Systems 2006, 4:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/4/1/2
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top-down traditional pyramid ownership structures i.e. a
two-level governing model applied in most of Central
Europe [32], where a board of directors consists of com-
pany managers and a supervisory board represents owners
and operate under standard profit oriented business prin-
ciples. Hospitals owned by Czech municipalities (dis-
tricts, towns) are governed by boards of directors
consisting of between six and ten employees (mainly
medical doctors), municipal representatives (not elected
but appointed based on political concerns) and business
professionals external to the organisation. This composi-
tion facilitates a close relationship between owners and
managers. Interests of these three groups are usually quite
distinct from each other and therefore corporate perform-
ance is not always regarded as the most important objec-
tive. Accordingly, disputes among the different in-groups
result in higher autonomy of management at the expense
of owners. Recently, some municipal public hospitals
were transformed into publicly owned enterprises based
on profit principles. It has been argued that controlling of
overall performance, organisational structure and divi-
sion of competencies would be better, but no substantial
change is expected to happen [30].
The next three 'good governance' principles are derived
from classical management principles which are inter-
linked. They concern the organisation and mechanistic
functioning of boards. Principle four is unity of direction,
five is unity of command and six is unity of accountability
and responsibility. Collectively, these principles relate to
the scalar principle of organisational design meaning that
the chain of command should flow in a straight line from
the top to the bottom of the organisation, i.e. from the
board's CEO down through the various staff levels in the
hospital, and that people in positions of power within the
organisation should be accountable for their actions and
directly responsible to their superiors.
In New Zealand, the DHB structure operates in a colle-
giate manner as it requires that the board consult with
stakeholders before major decisions about the use of
funds are made. Board meetings are formal and decisions
Table 3: D W Taylor's principles of 'good governance'
Principle Application
1. Knowing what governance is. CEO is responsible to board for implementing its policies plans and 
strategic directions.
Board is responsible for developing corporate policies and pans; 
monitoring and measuring organisational performance against those 
policies and plans; and acting as a voice of the ownership of the hospital.
Board's governance responsibilities are to provide a linkage between the 
hospital and its moral ownership; monitor the performance of the CEO; 
and develop an explicit statement of values for the hospital.
2. Achievement of strategic ends To be effective by providing the right service, at the right place, at the 
right time, and at an affordable cost.
Hospital governance structure must be such that performance objective 
can be set measured and accomplished.
3. Board-CEO relationship. Relationship is typified by a high level of mutual confidence and trust 
throughout the organisation and particulalry between the board of 
directors and CEO.
Governance viewed as a solemn partnership between board and CEO.
Board members and the CEO are equals, colleagues.
Organisations should be conceived of as a number of concentric circles 
with clients in the outermost circle and the CEO in the inner circle.
4. Unity of direction The CEO and board should function as a common body to pursue a 
common end. There should be only one board of governance, one CEO, 
one strategic plan, mission or vision, at any one time.
5. Unity of command Orders should be received from one superior only. Decision making 
authority should flow in a straight line from the top to the bottom of the 
organization.
6. Unity of accountability and responsibility Authority is a derivative of responsibility. Every employee, including the 
CEO, must be held accountable for the exercise of authority in 
executing his/her responsibilities.
7. Ownership needs. A hospital's board ultimate accountability is to the organisation's 
ownership.
8. Self-improvement and quality management Continuous improvement should be part of an organisational philosophy 
and should permeate all hospital management and governance practice.
9. Understanding the cost of governance These include; board member's personal opportunity costs, direct board 
meeting expenses, the costs of staff supporting boar activities, the costs 
associated with errors made by boards, and the costs of ineffectively 
structured governance-management-organisation relationships.Health Research Policy and Systems 2006, 4:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/4/1/2
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are made by voting on issues after a period of discussion
and debate. Nevertheless, final decisions made by boards
are implemented in a top down fashion and individual
board members are accountable to their community, CEO
and also to the MoH. Hospital managers are also directly
accountable to the board's CEO but this accountability is
neither personal nor financial. However, in the Czech
Republic, there is no similar clearly defined structure to
direct board functions. Instead a director carries out some
defined tasks but is not required to consult with stake-
holders [30]. The lack of formal procedures and perform-
ance indicators is consistent with findings about generally
poorer corporate governance in the Czech Republic [35].
Financial rewards for members of governing bodies are
not dependent on hospital performance in either country
and directors have a final decision making power without
being personally liable for hospitals' performance.
Principle seven refers to ownership needs. It points out that
the board's ultimate accountability is to the organisation's
owners, which in the case of public hospitals is the gov-
ernment. Even though New Zealand's DHBs are crown
entities, whose boards are responsible to the MoH, only a
minority of members (up to four) are appointed by the
MoH. The majority of board members (seven) are elected
by the community as their representatives. In regard to
this board composition, it has been found that hospitals
directed by mixed membership boards, i.e. including both
members external and internal to the organisation per-
form financially better than hospitals whose governing
bodies accommodate only people external to the organi-
sation [40,41]. Furthermore, having a mixed representa-
tive structure mitigates against the appointment of people
to positions because of political influence or favouritism
which may happen in hospitals in the Czech Republic
[31].
Principle eight embraces the notion of continuous self-
improvement and quality management. This principle is
underpinned by the understanding that hospitals and
health systems are not just economic but also social enti-
ties [40]. The New Zealand consultative mechanism and
collegiate style of governance enables the public or social
good function to be fulfilled the way that the DHB oper-
ates allows all members of the geographical area to partic-
ipate in electing people to represent their views. Direct
consultation with board members is possible and the
members of the public are invited to attend all board
meetings. The eighth principle has not yet been articu-
lated in the Czech system.
The last principle relates to understanding the cost of gov-
ernance and it addresses issues such as the payment of
board members, direct costs of meetings, staff supporting
board activities, costs associated with errors made by
boards, etc. In regard to the issue of financial and oppor-
tunity cost of board members' time, DHB members are
paid a reasonable amount for their work (NZ$23,000, i.e.
approximately US$15,000 annually) but in the Czech
Republic, board members (where they exist) are not paid
in the same manner [41]. The DHBs are subject to regular
audit process through the DHB Funding and Performance
Directorate to ensure funded services are financially via-
ble, clinically safe and of a high quality. Information
about the operation of public hospitals is made available
through government reports [4]. In the Czech Republic,
hospital's annual financial results are not subject to uni-
fied control mechanisms, although some municipal and
government authorities carry out regular checks. How-
ever, in regard to this point, it has been suggested that
auditors should be selected externally and not appointed
by health authorities [38], which is not applicable to
either country.
Conclusion
Financial, economical, or governance discussions about
health care systems are perceived with some ambiguity
and tension. It is believed that health care systems are
notoriously difficult to manage and "almost everywhere
reforms are being contemplated, organized, or imple-
mented, some in direct contradiction to others. Each is
claimed to make the system more responsive to user
needs, yet most are really designed to bring its component
parts under control – particularly financial control"
[[42]:58].
From this literature review and comparative case analysis
it is concluded that many of Taylor's [2] principles of
'good governance' are apparent in the current New Zea-
land health care system. These include knowing what gov-
ernance is, achievements of strategic goals, ownership needs,
self improvement and quality management, and understanding
the cost of governance. New Zealand now has reached a
period of stability and its' hospitals are administered by a
system of elected boards, i.e., a collegiate style of govern-
ance where a group of paid individuals work together for
a common purpose with supposedly equally shared
authority [43] and this appears to fit with Taylor's [2]
ideas about board-CEO relationships. Collegiate govern-
ance is closer to commercial activities in the form of part-
nerships which are the usual form of running small
businesses and providing professional services [1,43].
One benefit of the collegiate system and mixed member
composition of a board is that it provides a voice for pub-
lic ownership and accountability. In comparison, the
Czech system where board members are government
appointees seems to be detached from community needs.
A drawback of the collegiate style of governance relates to
the issue of leadership which may be difficult because ofHealth Research Policy and Systems 2006, 4:2 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/4/1/2
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the large number of board members who are involved in
decision making. Another problem with this governing
style may arise where board members and the CEO are
equal colleagues, and there is a possible conflict of interest
when the CEO sits as a voting member [39]. These are
issues that need special consideration in investigating the
board-CEO relationship principle of good governance. The
collegiate board structure might also make it difficult to
practice some of the 'top-down' management principles,
i.e. unity of direction, unity of command and unity of account-
ability and responsibility because of the more time consum-
ing consultative and participative style of decision
making.
The Czech health care governance is still developing. It
seems to lack several structural elements that underpin
Taylor's nine principles of 'good governance' such as for-
mal appointment procedures or defined performance
goals. The hospital governance style seems to be 'ad hoc',
i.e. inconsistent styles of governing and board composi-
tion are used in public hospitals. However, several advan-
tages may exist for Czech hospitals as a result of such a
non uniform approach, e.g. boards that are smaller in
number may be more ready for action and equally as
effective in achieving strategic goals, even though the
appointment of the 'right representative mix' of people
cannot be guaranteed. Nonetheless, an associated concern
about a system where people are appointed, is a chance
that a CEO might be swayed by employees or political
representatives holding positions of power inside the hos-
pital management structure to make decisions favourable
to themselves, rather than for the greater good of the pub-
lic [44].
Additionally, while board members are paid a modest
sum of money for their work in New Zealand, both gov-
erning systems do not fully address the issue of board
members' financial cost of governance. This is signalled as
an important issue for the future as recent research has
found that in situations where board members and CEOs
are underpaid, selection and performance problems are
more likely to arise [45]. Adequate reimbursement for the
highly skilled work of governing is therefore essential if
quality services are to be provided in health care [46].
To conclude, this case study analysis has demonstrated
that although the New Zealand and Czech Republic
health systems appear to show a large degree of conver-
gence, also evident is the fact that the resultant approaches
to public hospital governance differ on several counts.
This not surprising While some, but not all nine of Tay-
lor's [2] principles of 'good governance' were found to
exist in each country's hospital systems, the current styles
of governance clearly differ. There are several possible
implications for the theory of 'good governance' in health
care. First, the 'set' of nine principles may need refinement
based on further empirical research as they were not
observed universally in this study. Second, D W Taylor's
comment that the emergence of new governance models
"defy the principles of good governance" [[2]: 108] may
be unfounded because governance styles have evolved
from particular historical circumstances and they appear
to meet the requirements of different health care contexts.
A third possibility is that the governance principles in gen-
eral are best suited to the corporate world as they do not
fully reflect the special nature of health care. For the future
then, it might be necessary to ensure that the theoretical
principles of 'good governance' are more strongly inter-
twined with the practical and social good requirements
that are inherent in the delivery of hospital services.
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